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Practitioners--of comparative law focus their attention mainly
on Western European, Eastern European, and common law legal
systems.1 This focus excludes South American systems, which will
be discussed in this Article.
South American legal systems are nearly all considered to be
civil law systems.2 These systems are based upon various Europe-
an codes,3 including the French Code Civi 4 and the German
Birgerliches Gesetzbuch.5  Laws governing the formation of
* Visiting Professor of Comparative Law, Golden Gate University School of Law,
San Francisco, California; J.D. (Bologna), L.L.M. (Augsburg). The author would like to
thank Ms. Jessica Rudin, J.D. (Honors), for devoting her time to this Article.
1. For articles and books relating to the formation of contracts in these legal systems,
see 1 FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS
(Rudolf B. Schlesinger ed., 1968) [hereinafter FORMATION OF CONTRACTS]; Franco
Ferrari, La formazione del contratto, in ATLANTE DI DIRITrO PRIVATO COMPARATO
(Francesco Galgano & Franco Ferrari eds., 1992); Franco Ferrari, A Comparative Overview
on Offer and Acceptance Inter Absentes, 10 B.U. INT'L L.J. 171 (1992).
2. See Francesco Galgano, Civil Law e Common Law, in ATLANTE DI DIRIrTO
PRIVATO COMPARATO, supra note 1, at 2 (characterizing such countries as Guyana as a
common law system).
3. For an historical overview of the various European codes, see HANS SCHLOSSER,
GRUNDZUGE DER NEUEREN PRIVATRECHTS-GESCHICHTE (6th ed. 1988); FRANz
WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT (2d ed. 1967).
4. For a discussion of the influence of the French Civil Code, see Sir Maurice Amos,
The Code Napolgon and the Modern World, 10 J. COMP. LEGIS & INT'L L. 222 (1922);
Rodolfo Batiza, Origins of Modern Codification of the Civil Law: The French Experience
and Its Implications for Louisiana Law, 56 TUL. L. REV. 477 (1982); THE CODE
NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD (B. Schwartz ed., 1956); Yosiyuki Noda, La
r~ception du droit frangais au Japon, 15 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARt
543 (1963); SALACUSE, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW IN FRENCH SPEAKING AFRICA
(1969); Imre Zajtay, Les destinies du code civil, 6 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
COMPARI 792 (1954).
5. For a discussion of the history and the influence of the German Civil Code, see
Hans D61le, Das Biirgerliche Gesetzbuch in der Gegenwart, in FUNFZIGJAHRFEIER DES
DEUTSCHEN BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 14 (Hans Carl Nipperdey ed., 1950); Heilmut
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contracts are no exception. In fact, this is an area where it is
particularly easy to identify codes that inspired the legal systems
under review. By doing so, this Article will first examine some
preliminary considerations, and then focus on the theories of
"offer" and "acceptance" to determine when the contract is
formed.
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Agreement of the Parties in General
In all legal systems, the conclusion of a contract requires
consent,6 or agreement of the parties,7 which is defined as the
"manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more
persons.",8 Consent, however, must meet certain requirements for
the contract to be effective and enforceable.9 The agreement
G. Isele, Ein halbes Jahrhundert deutsches Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, 150 ARCHIV FOR DIE
CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 1 (1949); Ernst Rabel, Private Laws of Western Civilization, 10 LA.
L. REV. 265 (1950); Andreas Schwarz, Einfliisse deutscher Zivilistik im Auslande, in
SYMBOLAE FRIBURGENSES IN HONOREM OTIONIS LENEL 425 (1935).
6. It must be noted, however, that consent "bears two connotations. Under one,
consent means a party's acquiescence to the terms and conditions of a projected contract,
given with the intent of creating legal effects. Under the other, consent means the accord
of the parties' will on the projected contract." Satl Litvinoff, Consent Revisited: Offer
Acceptance Option Right of First Refusal and Contracts of Adhesion in the Revision of the
Louisiana Law of Obligations, 47 LA. L. REv. 699, 699 (1987). In the context of this
Article, the expression is used in the latter sense.
7. Even though the parties' agreement, or consent, is always required, in some
situations consent or agreement alone is not sufficient. See FRANCESCO MESSINEO, IL
CONTRATrO IN GENERALE 39 (1968) (stating that "the consensual contract is not the one
which requires consent (in fact consent is required for all contracts) but the one for which
the consent is also sufficient"). In fact, while some contracts, called "consensual"
contracts, require only this element, in other contracts, "the obligation [arises] not [only]
from the agreement of the parties but [also] from the delivery" of the goods that are the
objects of the contract to be formed. Ernest G. Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the
Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.J. 621, 623 (1919). This category of contracts, also known
in Roman law as contracts re contrahuntur, is not recognized in all legal systems. Id. For
a list of contracts re contrahuntur in Roman law, see id. For a list of European countries
that recognize contracts where the delivery is required for the contract to be formed, see
Ferrari, La formazione del contratto, supra note 1, at 69. South American legal systems
recognize the category of contracts qui re contrahuntur.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1973). For other definitions in civil
law systems, see, e.g., Guido Alpa, Le contrat "individuel" et sa d~finition, in REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 329 (1988); Ferrari, La formazione del contratto,
supra note 1, at 70-71.
9. FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 71-72.
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must be "free, serious, precise and intelligible,"1 which means
that it "must be free from illegality, duress, fraud and other
defects""' and must "meet certain basic tests of earnestness.'
t2
This Article will focus only on the formation of contracts, not the
elements that can vitiate the parties' assent.
B. Agreement As Meeting of Offer and Acceptance
Generally, an agreement of the parties exists only when "a
complete coincidence between the declarations of the will of the
different parties is reached.",13 These "declarations of will" refer
to the concepts of offer and acceptance. 4
Although it is commonly accepted among legal scholars that
agreement of the parties is composed of the declarations of will,'5
this is not always the case. 6 In fact, there may be situations
where it is very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between
an offer and an acceptance. 7 For instance, when the parties sign
a writing drafted by a third party, no distinction between offer and
acceptance can be made.'" The same is true with respect to
10. HELMUT KOZIOL & RUDOLF WELSER, BORGERLICHES RECHT 103 (1987).
11. FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 72.
12. Id. See also GORDON D. SCHABER & CLAUDE D. ROHWER, CONTRACTS IN A
NUTSHELL 8 (3d ed. 1990) (stating that a contract is an agreement "the terms of which are
sufficiently definite and certain to be legally enforceable").
13. FRANCESCO GALGANO, IL NEGOZIO GIURIDICO 61 (1988).
14. See Ellison Kahn, Some Mysteries of Offer and Acceptance, 72 S. AFR. L.J. 246,
246 (1955) (stating that consent "is usually said to be reducible to an offer... by the one
party which is accepted by the other"); Peter Klik, Mass Media and Offers to the Public:
An Economic Analysis of Dutch Civil Law and American Common Law, 36 AM. J. COMP.
L. 235, 235 (1988) ("Both civil law and common law treat the formation of a contract as
a two-step process.").
15. See, e.g., SA(JL LITVINOFF, Obligations, in 6 LA. Civ. L. TREATISE 211 (1969)
(expressly stating that consent is composed of offer and acceptance); see also KONRAD
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz, 1 INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 35 (2d ed. 1987)
(asserting that "[a] contract is formed when the parties express their agreement in
congruent declarations, a prior offer and a subsequent acceptance"); 1980 Vienna Sales
Convention arts. 14-24 [hereinafter CISGI (considering the formation of contracts through
the process of offer and acceptance).
16. For a similar affirmation, see, e.g., Litvinoff, supra note 6, at 702 (stating that the
process of formation of contracts by offer and acceptance "is not a ritual, that is, it should
not be regarded as indispensable for the formation of a valid contract").
17. Id. Indeed, a contract may be contained in a writing that does not reflect which
party made the initial offer and which party concluded the contract by his acceptance.
Moreover, parties may arrive at a contract through negotiations so involved as to make
it extremely difficult to ascertain who made the offer and who made the acceptance. Id.
18. For a discussion of the impossibility of analyzing this situation as a traditional offer
and acceptance, see POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS 5 (13th ed. 1950); SIR JOHN SALMOND &
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counter-offers. "[A]nalysis into offer and acceptance must not be
applied too vigorously or facts ... sacrificed to phrases."'19
Nevertheless, the distinction between offer and acceptance is the
traditional method of analyzing the formation of contracts,20 and
all South American legal systems recognize this distinction. Thus,
this Article will analyze the formation of contracts in South
American countries using the traditional approach of
distingusishing between offer and acceptance.
C. Agreement Inter Praesentes
No questions arise as to the existence of an agreement when
the contract is concluded between present parties.21 In all the
legal systems reviewed here, as well as in most other legal systems
and under the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, there is an "invari-
able rule that the offer lapses if the offeree does not accept it on
the spot. 22  In other words, between offer and acceptance, no
"considerable amount of time '23 needs to expire. This rule,
which is similar to the Roman concept of sponsio-stipulatio,24 has
GLAINVILLE WILLIAMS, LAW OF CONTRACTS 70-71 (1945). For cases addressing the
difficulty of distinction between offer and acceptance, see, e.g., North La. Milk Producers
Ass'n v. Southland Corp., 352 So. 2d 293 (2d Cir. 1977); Reid Bros. (S.A.), Ltd. v. Fischer
Bearings Co., 1943 A.D. 232 (S.A.); Collen v. Rietfontein Eng'g Works, 1948 [1] A.D. 413
(S.A.).
19. Kahn, supra note 14, at 247 (quoting GEOFFREY CHESHIRE & C.H.S. FIFOOT,
LAW OF CONTRACTS 24 (3d ed. 1952)).
20. See, e.g., Parviz Owisa, The Notion and Function of Offer and Acceptance Under
French and English Law, 66 TUL. L. REV. 871, 879 (1992).
21. See, e.g., ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 15, at 36.
22. Id. For a discussion of European laws in this area, see FORMATION OF
CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at sub B.I.I.C. (discussing the laws in Austria, Czechoslovakia,
England, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Yugoslavia). For this principle as set forth in the
Vienna Sales Convention, see CISG, supra note 15, art. 18(2) (stating that "[a]n oral offer
must be accepted immediately unless the circumstances indicate otherwise").
23. ALESSANDRI RODRIGUEZ, DE LOS CONTRATOS 20 (1988). See also H. GUSTAVO
PALACIO PIMENTEL, 1 MANUAL DE DERECHO CIVIL 252 (2d ed. 1987).
24. The prevailing opinion among legal scholars of the Roman sponsio-stipulatio is that
it "consisted of a formal question that was put by the prospective creditor (promisee):
'Spondesne . .?' (Do you solemnly promise.., to give a certain thing?). The prospective
debitor (promisor) would formally respond 'Spondeo' (I solemnly promise)." Owisa,
supra note 20, at 874 n.3. See also ROBERT W. LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW
345-46 (1956).
It has been argued, however, that "[n]one ... of the Roman law devices were very
similar to the doctrine of offer and acceptance as it later developed. Thus, the influence
of Roman law in shaping the present doctrine has been minimal." Owisa, supra note 20,
at 875.
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been codified in many South American countries, including
Argentina, 25  Brazil,26  Chile,27  Colombia,' Peru,29  Uru-
guay,3° and Venezuela.
31
The application of the aforementioned principle is not limited
to agreements reached by persons who are physically present, such
as during a face-to-face conversation. Indeed, as in most Europe-
an systems, 32 most South American systems treat offers made by
telephone or similar means as having been made in the presence
of the parties, 33 as long as "the person negotiating the deal is
operating the machine ... personally."'  This language results in
25. See CODIGO CIVIL [COD. Civ.] art. 1151 (Arg.) ("The proposal or the offer which
are made orally are deemed to be accepted only if accepted immediately.").
26. See CODIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 1081 (Braz.) (providing that an offer ceases to bind
the offeror "if it has been made to a present person and if it has not been accepted
immediately").
27. Some legal systems provide their rules on the formation of contracts in their
commercial codes instead of their civil codes. See Chile Commercial Code [Chile Com.c.]
art. 97.
28. As in Chile, Colombia's rules on the formation of contracts are set forth in the
commercial code. See Colombia Commercial Code [Colom. Com.c.] art. 850.
29. See Peru Civil Code [Peru C.c.] art. 1330. See also MOSSET ITURRASPE,
CONTRATOS 108 n.74 (1987) (discussing Article 1330).
30. See Uruguay Civil Code [Uru. C.c.] art. 1263(1) (providing that "[t]he oral offer
has to be accepted immediately").
31. See Venezuela Commercial Code [Venez. Com.c.] art. 110 ("In order to be
binding, an oral offer must be accepted immediately by the person to whom it is
addressed; if there is no such acceptance, the offeror is free.").
32. Some European legal systems have expressly provided rules that govern this
situation. See, e.g., ALLGEMEINES BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] § 862 (Aus.);
BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 147(1) (F.R.G.); POLGARL TORvtNYKONYV [PTK]
art. 211(2) (Hung.); CODE DES OBLIGATIONS [Co] art. 4(2) (Switz.); Yugoslavia Law on
Obligations [LO] art. 40(2). See also FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 168.
33. For a discussion of this rule in Argentina, see, e.g., ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at
108. For Brazilian law, see C.C. art. 1081(1) (Braz.); see also DARCY BESSONE, Do
CONTRATO TEORIA GERAL 149 (1987); JOAO FRANZEN DE LIMA, 1 CURSO DE DIREITO
CIVIL BRASILEIRO 326-27 (1977) (discussing the law). For Colombian law, see Colom.
Com.c. art. 850; see also GUILLERMO 0. FERNANDEZ & EDUARDO 0. ACOSTA, TEORIA
GENERAL DE LOS Acros o NEGOCIOS JURIDICOS 153 (3d ed. 1987); ZEA, 3 DERECHO
CIVIL: DE LAS OBLIGACIONES 99 (1990) (discussing the law). For Peruvian law, see Peru
C.c. art. 1330(3) ("A person who negotiates via telephone is deemed to be present."). For
a discussion of this rule in Venezuela, see, e.g., CASAS RINCON, 1 OBLIGACIONES CIVILES:
ELEMENTOS 49-50 (1946); MELICH-ORSINI, DOCTRINA GENERAL DE CONTRATO 152
(1985). For a list of methods of communication similar to the telephone, see, e.g.,
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 168 (comparing two-way radios and two-way
closed circuit televisions to the telephone).
34. FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 168. Where the person negotiating
the deal is not operating the machine, the aforementioned rule does not apply. Id. n.11.
This rule also applies to the use of a telex. Id.
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an unclear distinction between contracts framed in the absence of
the parties and contracts formed in the presence of the parties. A
better approach would be to distinguish between simultaneous
contracts and contracts formed in successive phases.35
D. The Form of the Agreement
At this point, it may be useful to examine the form of the
agreement. Like most other legal systems, 36 some South Ameri-
can systems allow the parties to form their agreement either
expressly or implicitly.37 The Argentina Civil Code defines
express agreement as an agreement "manifested by words, by
writings or by signings."38 Other South American codes, such as
the Civil Code of Brazil and the Commercial Code of Chile, use
the same definition.39
An agreement is implied, or tacit, when the parties manifest
their intention by "conduct or acts that presume [the agreement]
or that authorize its presumption,"'* or "when the parties mani-
fest their will by concludent behaviours which do not constitute
signs of language and by which the contractual intent can never-
theless be conveyed under specific circumstances."41 Thus, in
these situations, the intent of the parties is indicated by the parties'
actions rather than by specific words of agreement.
35. See ALESSANDRA BELLELLI, IL PRINCIPIO DI CONFORM1TA TRA PROPOSTA E
ACCETrAZIONE 16 n.18 (1992).
36. It is universally accepted that the consent (or the different manifestations of will
of which it is composed) can be either express or implied. This principle has been
expressly laid out in European countries such as Austria and Switzerland. See ABGB
§ 863(1) (Aus.); Co art. 1(2) (Switz.). This rule can also be found in Algeria Civil Code
art. 60, Egypt Civil Code art. 90(1), Lebanon Code of Obligations art. 179(1), Quebec Civil
Code art. 989, and LO art. 28(1) (Yugo.).
37. See, e.g., COD. Civ. art. 1145 (Arg.); C.C. art. 1079 (Braz.); Chile Com.c. art. 103.
See also BESSONE, supra note 33, at 149-51; JORGt GAMARRA, 11 TRATADO DE DERECHO
CIVIL URUGUAYO 110-12 (3d ed. 1990); MADURO LUYANDO, 3 DERECHO CIVIL: CURSO
DE OBLIGACIONES 490-91 (1975); MELICH-ORSINI, supra note 33, at 127-29.
38. COD. Civ. art. 1145 (Arg.).
39. See C.C. art. 1079 (Braz.); Chile. Com.c. art 103. This definition is also used by
European countries. See, e.g., CESARE MASSIMO BIANCA, 3 DIRrrro CIVILE IL
CONTRATO 212-13 (1987); GALGANO, supra note 13, at 63; ERNST KRAMER & BRUNO
SCHMIDLIN, DAS OBLIGATIONENRECHT. KOMMENTAR ZU ART. 1-18, 91 (1973).
40. COD. Civ. art. 1145 (Arg.). For a similar European definition, see, e.g., BIANCA,
supra note 39, at 213 (stating that there is an implied agreement when the contracting
parties manifest their will "by using instruments which allow with certainty to deduce the
existence of a contractual intent").
41. 3 BIANCA, supra note 39, at 213.
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III. OFFER
A. Willingness To Be Bound
In modern business practice, contracts are formed in succes-
sive phases and are generally analyzed by examining the offer and
acceptance.42 An offer is commonly defined either as a declara-
tion of will43 made by a party" or as a declaration addressed to
one or more specific persons in which the declarant manifests his
or her intent to be bound by a contract.45 This definition, which
is very similar to the definition adopted by the Uruguayan legisla-
ture,46 identifies at least one element required for a declaration
to be deemed an offer-the "intention of the offeror to be bound
in case of acceptance, 47 must be manifest.' It is the require-
ment of intent that distinguishes an offer from tratativas or
42. See, e.g., FRANCESCO GALGANO, 2(1) DIRITO CIVILE E COMMERCIALE 156
(1990); MELICH-ORSINI, 3 DERECHO CIVIL: OBLIGACIONES. APUNTES DE CLASES 274.
43. Most South American legal systems have adopted the German notion of
Rechtsgeschiift, or legal transaction. For the most recent discussion of Rechtsgeschidft, see
Francesco Galgano, Il negozio giuridico in Germania e in Italia, in ATLANTE DI DIRITTO
PRIVATO COMPARATO, supra note 1, at 53; Irina Lucidi, La recezione del negozio giuridico
in altri paesi, in ATLANTE DI DIRITO PRIVATO COMPARATO, supra note 1, at 59. It has
been doubted, as in other countries where this concept has been adopted, whether offer
and acceptance are a type of Rechtsgeschaft. South American and European systems reject
this notion. In Colombia, the legislature solved the aforementioned problem by stating
that "la oferta o propuesta, esto es, el proyecto de negocio giuridico que una persona
formula a otra." Colom. Com.c. art. 845.
44. For a similar definition, see, e.g., De Sola, El tiempo y el especio en la conclusion
de los contratos, in STUDIA IURIDICA 60, 72 (1959); 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 101;
MELICH-ORSINI, supra note 33, at 137.
45. For a provision considering proposals made to one or more specific persons, see,
e.g., CISG, supra note 15, art. 14(1). One must be aware, however, that even a proposal
not directed to one or more specific persons, such as a proposal made to an indefinite
number of persons, can be deemed an offer to the public. Id. Of course, this type of
proposal must fulfill the same requirements as an offer to one or more specific persons.
46. See Uru. C.c. art. 1262(2) ("The offer is a manifestation by one party of its intent
to be bound with the other party.").
47. CISG, supra note 15, art. 14(1).
48. This element is required in all South American countries. See, e.g., FERNANDEZ
& ACOSTA, supra note 33, at 162; 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 106; MELICH-ORSINI,
supra note 33, at 138; 1 PALACIO PIMENTEL, supra note 23, at 244; SANOJO, 3
INSTITUCIONES DE DERECHO CIVIL VENEZOLANO 17 (photo. reprint 1953).
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negociaqoes,49  the basis of the offer, or "proposicion
definitiva."5
B. Invitation To Make an Offer
The intent to be bound also distinguishes an offer from an
"invitation addressed to various persons in order to lead them to
make an offer of a future contract."5' Consequently, the decla-
ration of the addressee of the invitatio ad offerendum is what
constitutes a true offer.5 2 The distinction between an offer and
an invitation to make an offer is important because the two acts
have different effects. While an offer "becomes a contract if it is
accepted," 3 an invitation to make an offer does not give rise to
the offeree's power to accept. 4
Legal scholars have debated "whether the proposal is an offer
or an invitation to deal."55 South American systems, like those
of other nations, 56 have developed rules of law that attempt to
distinguish between the two. For example, South American
systems regard "the solicitation ... by way of notices, catalogues
or price lists" 57 not as offers, but as invitations to make offers.
58
49. For a distinction between offer and tratativas, or negociaqoes, see, e.g., 11
GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 106; SILVA PERREIRA, 3 ISTITUICOES DE DERECHO CIVIL
FoNrES DAS OBLIGA OES 26 (1986).
50. 1 PALACIO PIMENTEL, supra note 23, at 244.
51. 3 MELICH-ORSINI, supra note 42, at 271. For similar definitions in South
American systems, see also 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 106-07; 3 LUYANDO, supra
note 37, at 491; ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at 95. There are other elements that
distinguish an offer from an invitation to an offer. In fact, where a "declaration ... does
not contain all the essential elements of the contract to be concluded," it constitutes an
invitation to make an offer. GALGANO, supra note 13, at 73.
52. See 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 106.
53. FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 77.
54. See, e.g., Ferrari, La formazione del contratto, supra note 1, at 74.
55. See FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 77.
56. For U.S. and European laws concerning this topic, see, e.g., Ferrari, Laformazione
del contratto, supra note 1, at 74-75; FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 77-81.
57. ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at 95. See also 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 107.
For provisions that expressly lay down this rule, see, e.g., Chile Com.c. art. 105 ("Indefinite
offers contained in notices, catalogues, lists of current prices, prospectus or in any other
type of printed announcements, are not mandatory upon the offeror."); Colom. Com.c. art.
847 ("The offer of goods with an indication of price addressed to the public in notices,
prospectus or any other similar type of written advertisement, do not bind the offeror.").
58. In comparison, in Switzerland this rule has been expressly laid down: "The
dispatch of tariffs, price lists or similar items does not constitute an offer." Co art. 7(2)
(Switz.).
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Furthermore, legal scholars and legislators disagree about
what constitutes an offer and what constitutes an invitation to
enter into a contract. One often-discussed situation concerns the
display of articles in shop windows.59 Many South American
countries, such as Uruguay, hold that a display of articles is no
more than an invitation to make an offer, even when the price is
indicated.' This rule, also adopted by some European civil law
countries, such as Germany6  and Italy,' as well as most com-
mon law countries,63 is based on the premise that "if anyone had
the right to accept, the merchant would be forced to satisfy
everybody, which, from a practical point of view, is absurd."'  In
contrast, countries such as Argentina,' Brazil,' Colombia,67
and Venezuela' follow the rules of France69 and Switzland that
"the display with price-quotation is generally considered as being
an offer."7 Most of these countries agree, however, that when
a declaration of will contains "'clauses without commitment' or
For an identical rule, see LO art. 35 (Yugo.): "The dispatch of catalogues, price lists,
tariffs and similar items ... does not constitute an offer to form a contract, but only an
invitation to make an offer at the publicized conditions." For a more analytical treatment
of the European rule, see, e.g., FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 79.
59. For a discussion on this subject in the legal systems not covered by this study, see
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 79; Ferrari, La formazione del contratto,
supra note 1, at 74-75.
60. For the Uruguayan rule on display windows, see 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at
107.
61. For the German rule on display windows, see, e.g., WERNER FLUME,
ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BURGERLICHEN RECHTS DAS RECHTSGESCHAFT 635 (4th ed.
1992); FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 79.
62. GALGANO, supra note 13, at 74; Ferrari, La formacione del contratto, supra note
1, at 70.
63. See, e.g., FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 79: "Common law countries
(England, India, United States) ... agree that the mere display of articles in a shop
window is an invitation to deal, even if the price is indicated." For a comparative
treatment of this problem, see Percy H. Winfield, Some Aspects of Offer and Acceptance,
55 L.Q.R. 499, 517-18 (1939).
64. See 1 CASAS RINCON, supra note 33, at 49-50.
65. See, e.g., ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at 100.
66. See 3 PERREIRA, supra note 49, at 28.
67. ZEA, supra note 33, at 100. See also Colom. Com.c. art. 848.
68. See 3 LUYANDO, supra note 37, at 492; MELICH-ORSINI, supra note 33, at 147-48.
69. See, e.g., HENRI MAZEAUD ET AL., 1(2) LE QONS DE DROIT CIVIL: OBLIGATIONS
119 (8th ed. 1991).
70. Co art. 7(3) (Switz.).
638 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp.L.J. [Vol. 16:629
'subject to confirmation,' 71 it will be regarded as an invitation to
make an offer.72
C The Definite Offer
Intent to be bound is not the only requirement for a proposal
to be considered an offer. In order to constitute an offer, a
proposal must also be definite73  ("completa" or
"autosuficiente");74 in other words, it must contain the essential
elements of a contract. This quality of the offer, which is expressly
required in only a few systems, has been defined as the "first
requirement of the offer. Only in these situations [when a
proposal is definite] is it possible to explain that the mere
acceptance results in the conclusion of the contract.
' 75
The Convention on the International Sales of Goods
("CISG") also requires a proposal to be definite. Article 14(1)
identifies some elements necessary to characterize a proposal as an
offer rather than a mere invitation to make an offer: "[a] proposal
is sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and expressly or
implicitly fixes these, or makes a provision for determining the
quantity and the price."76 The above elements are not considered
71. 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 107.
72. For example, in Germany, a proposal containing expressions such as freibleibend
("remaining free") or ohne Obligo ("without obligation") cannot be deemed an offer.
Therefore, where a proposal contains these expressions, which are frequently used in
German business practice, "the 'acceptance', namely the affirmative answer to the
proposal, is in law an offer which the proponent may or may not accept." Arthur
Nussbaum, Comparative Aspects of the Anglo-American Offer and Acceptance Doctrine,
36 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 927 (1936).
73. See CISG, supra note 15, art. 14(1). In France, the expression used is offrepr~cise.
See JACQUES GHESTIN, Le Contrat: Formation, in 2 TRAITi DE DROIT CIVIL (Jacques
Ghestin ed., 1988).
See, e.g., Luis DIEZ-PICAZO & ANTONIO GULLON, SISTEMA DEL DERECHO CIVIL 75
(1988); PIERRE ENGEL, TRAITI DES OBLIGATIONS EN DROIT SUISSE 155 (1973);
CHRISTIAN LARROUMET, DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 220 (1986).
74. ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at 99. See also ANTONIO CHAVES, TRATADO DE
DEREITO CIVIL 398 (1984); 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 109.
75. ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at 99. See also 3 ZEA, supra note 33, at 98. Argentina
expressly requires that an offer be "definite." See COD. CIV. art. 1148 ("[I]n order to be
in the presence of an offer, it must be addressed to one or more specific persons, it must
refer to a specific contract and contain all the essential elements of the contract.").
76. CISG, supra note 15, art. 14(1). The 1964 Uniform Law on the Formation of
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("ULFIS") also requires the definiteness of
an offer; however, it does not define any of the essential elements.
Some South American legislatures consider price to be an essentiale contractus. See,
e.g., C.C. art. 1126 (Braz.); Chile C.c. art. 1808; Colom. C.c. art. 1864; Peru C.c. art. 1529;
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exhaustive.' Indeed, they constitute a "minimum and the offer
can encompass all kind of other elements.i
78
D. Revocable Offer
While most legal systems have similar laws concerning intent
and definiteness of an offer, laws differ significantly with regards
to the "fuerza vinculante," or "obligatoriedad"--or the revocabili-
ty--of the offer.79  This issue arises in South American legal
systems only when there is no express statement, because "where
an offer is expressly stated to be revocable [it] can be revoked,"'
and, conversely, where an offer is expressly stated to be irrevoca-
ble, it cannot be revoked.8 Consequently, revocability becomes
an issue only when the offer is silent as to this question.
Uru. C.c. art. 1664; Venez. C.C. art. 1479. Article 14(1)'s requirement that an offer must
indicate the price does not contradict Article 55 of CISG. See Eugen Bucher,
Preisvereinbarung als Voraussetzung der Vertragsgiultigkeit beim Kauf. Zum angeblichen
Widerspruch zwischen Art. 14 und Art. 55 des 'Wiener Kaufrechts,'in WIENER KAUFRECHT
53 (Eugen Bucher ed., 1991).
For a comparison of laws regarding the price indication requisite, see John Murray,
The 'Open Price' Sale of Goods Contract in a Worldwide Setting, 89 COM. L.J. 491 (1984);
WOLFGANG Wrrz, DER UNBESTIMMTE KAUFPREIS. EIN RECHTSVERGLEICHENDER
BEITRAG ZUR BEDEUTUNG DES PRETIUM CERTUM (1989).
77. See, e.g., KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAuFRECHT 129 (Peter
Schlechtriem ed., 1990); HANS ENDERLEIN ET AL., KONVENTION DER VEREINTEN
NATIONEN OBER VERTRAGE OBER DEN INTERNATIONALEN WARENKAUF: KOMMENTAR
62 (1985); ROLF HERBER & BEATE CZERWENKA, 11 INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT.
KOMMENTAR ZU DEM UBEREINKOMMEN DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN 81-82 (1991).
78. BERNARD AUDIT, LA VENTE INTERNATIONALE DE MARCHANDISES: CONVENTION
DES NATIONS-UNIES DU 11 AVRIL 1980, 58 (1990).
79. See, e.g., 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 112; MELICH-ORSINI, supra note 33, at
269; ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at 101; PALACIOS HERRERA, APUNTES DE OBLIGACIONES
354 (1956); 3 SANOJO, supra note 48, at 17.
80. FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 109.
According to the view prevailing in some systems there is a presumption that
such a proposal does not constitute an offer, but only an invitation to deal. This
presumption is not conclusive, and in all systems under consideration [Austria,
France, England, Germany, India, Italy, Poland, South Africa, and the United
States] it is possible by apt words effectively to make a revocable offer.
Id.
81. In some legal systems, an offer that is expressly stated to be irrevocable is,
nonetheless, revocable. For example, even in a common law system such as England, "the
consideration doctrine stood in the way of holding irrevocable an offer made neither for
value nor under seal, even when the offeror had waived his right to revoke." Nussbaum,
supra note 72, at 925. In India, the same result holds true because of the statutory
requirement of consideration. See FORMATION OF CONTRACrS, supra note 1, at 784 n.4.
Consequently, "[t]here is nothing irrevocable about an offer as it can be revoked right up
and till the time it is received and before it is accepted." Id. n.6 (quoting Pokhar Mal v.
Khanewal Oil Mills, A.I.R. 1945 Lah. 260, 263).
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The South American legal systems adopt either the French-
based or the German-based approach to the issue of revocability.
Countries such as Argentina,82 Chile,83 and Uruguay,8 as well
as the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention,8 have adopted rules similar
to the French law, providing that "the offer can be revoked until
it has been accepted."'  If, however, "the offeree has relied on
the offer in good faith, he has a claim for damages for the loss he
suffered in preparing to perform," 87 in accordance with the doc-
trine of culpa in contrahendo.'
82. COD. Civ. art. 1150 (Arg.).
83. See RODRIGUEZ, supra note 23, at 18.
84. See Uru. C.c. art. 1265. See also 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 113-14.
85. See CISG, supra note 15, art. 16(1). Article 16(1) states: "[U]ntil a contract is
concluded an offer may be revoked, if the revocation reaches the offeree before he has
dispatched an acceptance." See also Konrad Dilger, Das Zustandekommen von Kaufvertra-
gen im Aussenhandel nach internationalem Einheitsrecht und nationalem Sonderrecht, 45
RABELS ZEITsCHRIFr 175 (1981); Shahdeen Malik, Revocable or Irrevocable Will. Art. 16
of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale Ensures Uniformity?, 25 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 26 (1985); ELISABETH STERN, ERKLARUNGEN IM UNCITRAL-
KAuFREcHT 23-28 (1990). Not all commentators, however, seem to be aware of the origin
of the rule provided in Article 16. See, e.g., 11 HERBER & CZERWENKA, supra note 77,
at 88; GERT REINHART, UN-KAUFREcHT: KOMMENTAR ZUM UBEREINKOMMEN DER
VEREINTEN NATIONEN VOM 11: APRIL 1980 OBER VERTRAGE OBER DEN
INTERNATIONALEN WARENKAUF 51 (1991) (arguing that the rule at issue was derived
from common law).
86. "Las ofertas pueden ser rectratadas mientras no hayan sido aceptadas." COD. CIv.
art. 1150 (Arg.). For a discussion of the law, see Ferrari, La formazione del contratto,
supra note 1, at 75; GHESTIN, supra note 73, at 227-28; Litvinoff, supra note 6, at 714; 1(2)
MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 69, at 121; RIEG, LE ROLE DE LA VOLONTt DANS L'ACTE
JURIDIQUE EN DROIT CIVIL FRAN AIS ET ALLEMAND 83-84 (1961). For quotation of
French scholars by South American legal writers, see, e.g., CODIGO CIVIL Y LEYES
COMPLEMENTARIAS COMENTADO, ANOTADO Y CONCORDADO 764 (Belluscio ed., 1984)
[hereinafter CODIGO CIVIL]; GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 113-14; ITURRASPE, supra note
29, at 101-02; 3 ZEA, supra note 33, at 100-01.
87. See 1 ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 15, at 41 ("It is difficult to tell from the cases
what amount of damages, if any, may be ordered against an offeror who has [revoked] his
offer.").
88. See Rudolf von Ihering, Culpa in contrahendo oder Schadenersatz bei nichtigen
oder nicht zur Perfection gelangten Vertragen, 4 IHER. JAHRB. 1 (1861). For a discussion
of the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo, see, e.g., Ernst Blohler, Zum Problem der "culpa
in contrahendo," 75 SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 357 (1979); CLAUS-WILHELM
CANARIS, DIE VERTRAUENSHAFrUNG IM DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHT (1971); Karl Larenz,
Bemerkungen zur Haftung fAr "culpa in contrahendo, " in FESTSCHRIFT BALLERSTEDT 397
(1975); PAUL PIOTET, CULPA IN CONTRAHENDO: ET RESPONSABILITI
PRICONTRACrUELLE EN DROIT PRIVP_ SUISSE (1963).
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E. Irrevocable Offer and Withdrawal
Other South American systems, such as Brazil,89 Colom-
bia,' and Peru,91 have adopted the German rule, which provides
that "the offeror is bound by his offer, in the sense that he cannot
withdraw it, for the period of time he specifies or, if he specifies
no period, for a reasonable time."'  Countries following this rule
differ, however, in their treatment of offers that are revoked
before the expiration of the "reasonable" time limit.93 In some
systems, such as that of Colombia, the revocation prevents the
conclusion of the contract and results in the offeror's liability.94
89. See C.C. arts. 1080-81 (Braz.).
90. See, e.g., Ferrari, La formazione del contratto, supra note 1, at 85.
91. See Peru C.c. art. 1382; see also art. 1330 of the old Peru Civil Code; 1 PALACIO
PIMENTEL, supra note 23, at 246.
92. 1 ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 15, at 41. See C.C. art. 1081 (Braz.); see also
Nussbaum, supra note 72, at 925. Nussbaum summarizes the reasons for the rule as
follows:
The offeree needs a dependable basis for his decision. It may be that he has to
take immediate measures in view of the contract intended. Furthermore, the
offeree, prompted by the offer, will possibly order raw materials in the case of
a buying offer, or clear stock in the case of a selling offer. [Therefore,] it would
seem fair and consistent to keep the offeror to the promise, as expressed in his
offer, to its full extent.
Id.
In Germany, however, the parties may decide to make revocable offers. See BGB
§ 145 (F.R.G). "Whoever offers to another to enter into a contract is bound by the offer,
unless he has excluded being so bound." Id. (emphasis added). Formerly-socialist and
Scandinavian systems have also adopted the German rule. For laws in the formerly-
socialist countries, see, e.g., Czech C. C. art. 45(3); PTK § 211(1) (Hung.); LO art.
36(1)(Yugo.); see also OLYMPIAD S. IOFFE, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 155 (1988); M.G.
Rosenberg, Conclusion of Contract, in USSR CONTRACr LAW (V.S. Pozdnyakov ed.,
1982); VONDRACEK, COMMENTARY ON THE CZECHOSLOVAKAK CIVIL CODE 65-66 (1988);
W.J. Wagner, Obligations in Polish Law, in POLISH CIVIL LAW 55 (D. Lasok ed., 1974);
ALESSANDRO WOLTER, DIRITTO CIVILE POLACCO 274 (1976). For a discussion of the
laws in Scandinavian systems, see, e.g., Jan Hellner, Contracts and Sales, in AN
INTRODUCTION TO SWEDISH LAW 235 (Stig Str6mholm ed., 1988); HANS-JOACHIM
MERTENS & ECKARD REHBINDER, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT: KOMMENTAR ZU
DEN EINHEITLICHEN KAUFGESETZEN 326 (1975); ERNST RABEL, DAS RECHT DES
WARENKAUFS: EINE RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE DARSTELLUNG 70-71 (1958); Leif Sev6n,
Contract Law, in THE FINNISH LEGAL SYSTEM 140-41 (Jaakko Uotila ed., 1985).
93. The "reasonable time" limit, like in European systems, "must be determined by
the judge, in his discretion, at the appropriate time." 1 PALACIO PIMENTEL, supra note
23, at 247. For similar rules in South American law, see ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at 104;
ARNOLD WALD, CURSO DE DIREITO CIVIL BRASILEIRO: OBRIGAQOES E CONTRAToS 132
(1989).
94. See Colom. Com.c. art. 846; see also 3 ZEA, supra note 33, at 100-01.
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In other systems, such as those of Brazil,95 Peru,' and Vene-
zuela, 7 the acceptance of an offer concludes the contract despite
an ineffective revocation and, therefore, does not give rise to
liability.9" Although the Venezuelan legislature preferred the
principle of the revocability of the offer," legal writers and the
courts preferred the German-based irrevocability doctrine because
they believed it would "avoid the extreme consequences of similar
principles.'"'0° Consequently, in Venezuela, "the revocation does
not have any effect and the acceptance received by the addressee
concludes the contract." 10 1
Although it is not possible to revoke an irrevocable offer, all
legal systems and the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention recognize that
an irrevocable offer may be withdrawn. 2 While a revocation
renders an offer ineffective after it is received by the offeree, a
withdrawal also makes an offer ineffective if it is still in itinere. In
some countries, such as Argentina" 3 and Uruguay,"° the revo-
cation does not have to reach the offeree before or at the same
time as the offer for a withrawal to be effective. In contrast,
95. See, e.g., BESSONE, supra note 33, at 166; WALD, supra note 93, at 130.
96. See 1 PALACIO PIMENTEL, supra note 23, at 255-56.
97. See CASAS RINCON, supra note 33, at 49-50.
98. The German system takes the same approach. See 1 ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra
note 15, at 41 ("As the wording of the BGB makes clear, the offeror is not simply under
a duty not to withdraw the offer but actually has no power to do so; instead of giving rise
to liability in damages, therefore, an attempted withdrawal simply has no legal effect at
all.").
99. See, e.g., 1 CASAS RINCON, supra note 33, at 50-51; 3 LUYANDO, supra note 37,
at 489; MENDOZA BRANDT, APUNTES SOBRE EL CONTRATO 17 (1938); 3 SANOJO, supra
note 48, at 16-17.
100. MELICH-ORSINI, supra note 33, at 268.
101. 3 LuYANDO, supra note 37, at 489. See also 1 CASAS RINCON, supra note 33, at
54; HERRERA, supra note 79, at 354.
102. See CISG, supra note 15, art. 15(2) ("An offer, even if it is irrevocable, may be
withdrawn if the withdrawal reaches the offeree before or at the same time as the offer.").
The German Civil Code uses the expression widerruf (revocation) not only to indicate a
revocation, but also to indicate a withdrawal. See, e.g., BGB § 130(1) (F.R.G) ("A
declaration of will required to be made to another, if made in his absence, becomes
effective at the moment when it reaches him. It does not become effective if a revocation
reaches him previously or simultaneously." (emphasis added)). After the enactment of the
1980 Vienna Sales Convention, however, even Germany has distinguished between revoca-
tion and withdrawal. Thus, the term Widerruf is now used only to indicate a revocation,
while the expression Rucknahme is used to mean withdrawal.
103. See, e.g., CODIGO CIVIL, supra note 86, at 765.
104. See, e.g., 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 149.
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Brazil,1 5 Peru,' °6 and Venezuela 7 consider knowledge to be
the determinative factor, and thus, consider it irrelevant whether
the offer or the withdrawal reaches the offeree first. As long as
the offeree has knowledge of the withdrawal, the offer will be
ineffective even if it reached the offeree first.
IV. ACCEPTANCE
A. In General
After examining the offer, its counterpart, the acceptance,
must be examined. Acceptance is defined as the declaration
sufficient to conclude the contract, 1°8 provided that the offer
meets all prerequisites. It is the positive exercise of the power of
acceptance,"° i.e., the sense of a "an affirmative response to the
offer to contract."" 0
Formal requirements of the acceptance correspond to those of
the offer,"' which are based upon the "general principle of
informality.""' Where a formal prerequisite is required, howev-
er, the acceptance must comply with the formal prerequisite."3
The same is true where the offer "demands that the acceptance be
made in a specific manner.
n11 4
105. See, e.g., BESSONE, supra note 33, at 172-73; GOMES, CONTRATOS 72-73 (1959).
106. See 1 PALACIO PIMENTEL, supra note 23, at 247.
107. See 1 CASAS RINCON, supra note 33, at 52-53; MELICH-ORSINI, supra note 33, at
144.
108. For a similar definition of acceptance in South America, see, e.g., GOMES, supra
note 105, at 67; ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at 99; PEDRO PINEDA LEON, PRINCIPIOS DE
DERECHO MERCANTIL 212 (1972); 3 ZEA, supra note 33, at 98.
109. Some assert that the rejection of the offer constitutes a negative exercise of the
power of acceptance. See, e.g., LUIGI FERRI, LEZIONI SUL CONTRATrO 81 (1987).
110. GOMES, supra note 105, at 70. See also CISG, supra note 15, art. 18(1) ("A
statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent to an offer is an
acceptance ....").
111. See 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 125 ("As far as the form is concerned, one
must apply the principles which govern the form of the offer .... ").
112. 1 ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 15, at 46. "[In many legal systems this principle
is made explicit, as in art. 11 OR, which lays down that the validity of contracts depends
on a particular form 'only if' the law so specifies (see also §883 ABGB)." Id.
113. See, e.g., Uru. C.c. art. 1621.
114. 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 125.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp.L.J. [Vol. 16:629
Also, like the offer, the acceptance may be express or im-
plied.115  It is the possibility of implied acceptance, criticized by
some, that gives rise to the problem of acceptance by silence.
1 6
B. Acceptance by Silence
Most South American legal systems and other legal systems,
as well as the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, adhere to the
principle that acceptance cannot be inferred from the offeree's
mere silence.1 7 This principle contrasts with the principle "el
que calla otorga,""' which corresponds to the canon law rule on
the basis of which "those who remain silent agree."" 9  Conse-
quently, South American countries, like most other countries,'
generally adhere to the Roman rule that "those who remain silent
do not agree, nor do they disagree,"' or, "[h]e who remains
silent does not say anything."' 22 This rule also applies where the
offer contains a clause providing that the offeree is assumed to
have accepted the offer unless he expressly rejects it."2
115. See, e.g., RODRIGUEZ, supra note 23, at 17; GOMES, supra note 105, at 70.
116. See, e.g., 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 189 (criticizing implied acceptance
because "the distinction between the expressions express and implied is neither certain nor
exact. Would it not be better to depart from that distinction? Since the problem is to
verify whether a will has been expressed, there is no interest in distinguishing between the
means chosen to express the will. Once a will has been expressed, the will's value is the
same, independent from the means employed to express it.").
117. See, e.g., 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 217, 224. See also CISG, supra note 15,
art. 18(1) ("Silence or inactivity does not in itself amount to acceptance."); FORMATION
OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 131 ("As a general rule silence does not amount to
acceptance of an offer." (emphasis added)).
118. See, e.g., MELICH-ORSINI, supra note 33, at 130.
119. See, e.g., GOMES, supra note 105, at 57; ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at 89 n.19.
120. See E.A. Farnsworth, Comment on Art. 18, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 166-67 (Cesare M. Bianca
& Michael J. Bonell eds., 1987) ("It is a rule in all legal systems that an acceptance will
not ordinarily be inferred from the offeree's mere silence." (emphasis added)).
Nevertheless, some Swiss legal writers have argued, on the basis of Article 6 of the
Swiss Civil Code, that in Switzerland, "silence corresponds to acceptance." PAUL PIOTET,
LA FORMATION DU CONTRAT EN DOCTRINE GtNtRALE ET EN DROIT PRIVt SUISSE 87
(1956). This author does not share their view. For a criticism, see Ferrari, La formazione
del contratto, supra note 1, at 72-73.
121. DIG. 50.17.142. Even under Roman law, however, there were situations where a
rule similar to the canon law principle applied: "quae patris voluntati non repugnat,
consentire intelligitur." Id. 23.1.12.
122. ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at 89; see also MELICH-ORSINI, supra note 33, at 130
("[E]l que calla ni ortoga ni niega.").
123. See, e.g., 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 24; MELICH-ORSINI, supra note 33, at
131. For the rule of law under the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, see Farnsworth, supra
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This does not mean, however, that silence can never constitute
acceptance. Indeed, "negative conduct (silence), interpreted in the
context of accompanying circumstances, may acquire the voice that
corresponds to positive conduct.' 2 4 Silence generally constitutes
acceptance in the following situations: (1) where the law creates a
duty to speak;'" (2) where the offer has been made for the sole
benefit of the offeree; 12 6 and (3) where both parties agreed that
silence would amount to acceptance. 27
C. Conformity of the Acceptance with the Offer
In order to constitute acceptance, the affirmative answer to an
offer must meet certain conditions. One requirement is that the
acceptance must conform with the offer.' 28 In other words, the
acceptance "must coincide with each and all the points or elements
of the offer,"'129 so that the acceptance constitutes the offer's
"mirror image."'3
According to the "mirror image" rule adopted in most South
American legal systems as well as in most other civil law sys-
note 120, at 167 ("The offeror cannot by himself derogate from the general rule that the
offeree's silence is not in itself acceptance. Thus it would not change the result if the
offeror added at the end of his offer to sell goods, 'I shall assume that you have accepted
my offer if I do not hear from you within a week.' Even if the offeree remained silent in
the face of such an offer, the offeror could not treat the offer as accepted.").
124. 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 217. See also GOMES, supra note 105, at 57-58;
MELICH-ORSINI, supra note 33, at 130; ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at 89.
125. A duty to speak arising from law can be expressly found, for example, in Article
919 of the Argentinean Civil Code: "Silence in contrast to conduct or to a question, is not
considered to be an expression of will pursuant to the conduct or the question unless the
law requires an explanation." COD. CIV. art. 919 (Arg.).
126. See BESSONE, supra note 33, at 154.
127. See, e.g., id.; MELICH-ORSINI, supra note 33, at 132; 1 PALACIO PIMENTEL, supra
note 23, at 250.
128. See generally FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 955. There is
acceptance when there is "[c]onformity with the terms of the offer. 'The party making an
offer may require the offer to be accepted by the offeree without variance."' Id. For the
application of this requirement in South American systems, see, e.g., 11 GAMARRA, supra
note 37, at 118. For a criticism of the traditional point of view, see BELLELLI, supra note
35.
129. ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at 105.
130. See, e.g., JOHN CALAMARI & JOSEPH PERILLO, CONTRACTS 102 (3d ed. 1987);
Stojan Cigoj, International Sale of Goods: Formation of Contracts, 23 NETH. INT'L L. REV.
257, 292 (1976); S.K. Date Bah, Commentary on United Nation Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods 1980: Overview and Selective Commentary, 11 GHANA
L. REV. 50, 58 (1979); Farnsworth, supra note 120, at 178; Hellner, supra note 92, at 235.
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tems,131 the acceptance must entirely correspond to the offer.
Thus, the offeree must accept not only the "essential" elements,
but all of the elements.132  If the offeree accepts the offer with
modifications or reservations, 33 the 'acceptance' is merely a
counter-offer. Several South American countries, such as
Colombia, 34  Argentina, 35  Brazil, 36  Chile,137  Peru, 38  Uru-
guay,139 and Venezuela"4 have adopted this principle. In these
countries, a counter-offer acts as a rejection of the original
offer.' 41 This results in the "caducidad" of the offer, leading to
a renewed contractual autonomy for the offeror.
142
Recently, the "mirror image" rule seems to have lost some of
its influence. In fact, the United States and the 1980 Vienna Sales
Convention have adopted a different principle: replies containing
"additional or different terms which do not materially alter the
terms of the offer constitute an acceptance.
'' 43
131. See DIEZ-PICAZO & GULLON, supra note 73, at 75; GALGANO, supra note 13, at
62; Ferrari, La formazione del contratto, supra note 1, at 76.
132. Some Argentinean legal writers disagree about the existence of the "mirror image"
rule. See, e.g., ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at 97 (asserting that the contract is formed
"where there is an agreement of the essential [clause] even if there is disagreement of the
secondary [clause]"). Id.
133. The terms generally used in South American countries are adiqoes and restriqoes.
134. See Colom. Com.c. art. 855.
135. See COD. Civ. art. 1152 (Arg.).
136. See C.C. art. 1083 (Braz.).
137. See Chile Com.c. art. 102.
138. See Peru C.c. art. 1376.
139. See Uru. C.c. art. 1267(2).
140. See Venez. art. 1137(7).
141. This is in contrast to the laws of some European countries. In Italy, for example,
there is doubt that the qualified acceptance, which constitutes a counter-offer, must be
considered to be a rejection of the first offer. See, e.g., 3 BIANCA, supra note 39, at 231.
But see CARRESI, IL CoNTRATro 771 n.182 (1987).
142. See also BESSONE, supra note 33, at 190-91; De Sola, supra note 44, at 77; 11
GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 119-20; 1 PALACIO PIMENTEL, supra note 23, at 251.
143. CISG, supra note 15, art. 19(2). Article 19(2) also indicates some of the terms
that, if added, would make the reply an invalid acceptance: "Additional or different terms
relating, among others things, to the price, payment, quality and quantity of the goods,
place and time of delivery, extent of one party's liability to the other or the settlement of
disputes are considered to alter the terms of the offer materially." Id. In the United
States, Section 60 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts sets forth the "mirror image"
rule; nevertheless, the rule has become weaker. See, e.g., UCC § 2-207(1).
[A] definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it
states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms.
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D. The Time Limit for Acceptance
As noted above, the acceptance generally must conform to all
the elements of the offer. For example, there must be
"[c]onformity with the manner of acceptance provided for by the
offer."' 44 In addition, the acceptance must also comply with time
limits fixed by the offeror. 145  If the offeror does not impose a
time limit, it is set by law or based on the nature of the contract.
Most legal systems, including Argentina,' 6 Brazil,
147 Co-
lombia,1 48 Peru,'49 Uruguay,' and Venezuela,15' permit the
offeror to set a time limit for acceptance. The 1980 Vienna Sales
Convention has also adopted this rule. 52 Where the offeror has
not fixed a time limit, the general rule in these countries is that the
offer remains open for a reasonable period of time.153 Courts
determine what constitutes a reasonable period of time based on
criteria such as (1) the time required to communicate the accep-
Id.
144. FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 956. For the U.S. law, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50(1): "Acceptance of an offer is a manifesta-
tion of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a manner invited or required
by the offer." Id.
145. "[A]II legal systems agree that the offeror may effectively specify a time limit for
acceptance." FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 166. This has been explicitly
provided for in several legal systems not under review here. See, e.g., ABGB § 862 (Aus.);
C.c. art. 45(1) (Czech.); PTK § 211(2) (Hung.); C.c. art. 1326(2) (Italy); Co art. 3(1)
(Switz.).
146. See C6D. Civ. art. 1150 (Arg.).
147. See C.C. art. 1081 (Braz.).
148. See Colom. Com.c. art. 853.
149. See Peru C.c. art. 1375.
150. See Uru. C.c. art. 1266.
151. See Venez. C.c. art. 1137(2).
152. See CISG, supra note 15, art. 20(1).
A period of time for acceptance fixed by the offeror in a telegram or a letter
begins to run from the moment the telegram is handed in for dispatch or from
the date shown on the letter or, if no such date is shown, from the date shown
on the envelope. A period of time for acceptance fixed by the offeror by
telephone, telex or other means of instantaneous communication, begins to run
from the moment that the offer reaches the offeree.
Id.
153. This rule has been set forth in Austria, Germany, Hungary, Russia, Switzerland,
the United States, and Yugoslavia. See Ferrari, La formazione del contratto, supra note
1, at 75.
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tance, 54 (2) prior conduct of the parties, (3) fluctuating value,
and (4) the perishable nature of the goods. 55
The "reasonable time" rule does not apply, however, if the
law imposes a time limit for acceptance. Countries that impose
a time limit by law include Chile, 56 Colombia,157 and Uru-
guay.1
5 8
E. Late Acceptance: The Offeree's Delay
Quid iuris applies where the offeree sends the acceptance
after the time limit for acceptance has expired. Under Brazilian
law, like the German law upon which it is based,'59 a late accep-
tance constitutes a new offer.'6° The same is true in Argenti-
na,161 Colombia,162 and Peru' 63
In contrast, Venezuela and Uruguay follow different rules. In
Uruguay, a late acceptance is nevertheless valid if the offeror does
not inform the offeree of his intention not to be bound."6 In
154. The time strictly necessary for the offeree's reply to reach the offeror is composed
of "a) the time necessary for the offer to reach the addressee of the offer; b) the time
passing from the receipt of the offer to the dispatch of the acceptance or the rejection of
the offer by the addressee of the offer; [and] c) the time necessary for the offeree's
manifestation to reach the offeror." ERNST KRAMER & BRUNO SCHMIDLIN, DAS
OBLIGATIONENRECHT. KOMMENTAR ZU ART. 1-18, 262 (1973).
155. See FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 167-68.
156. See Chile Com.c. art. 98(2) ("The offer in writing must be accepted or rejected
within twenty-four hours if the addressee lives in the same place as the offeror or by
return mail.").
157. See Colom. Com.c. art. 851 ("[W]here the offer is in writing, it must be accepted
or rejected within the six days following the date of the offer, if the addressee resides in
the same place as the offeror; if he resides in a different place, an allowance for distance
shall be added to the deadline of less than six days.").
158. See Uru. C.c. art. 1266(2) ("Acceptance will be considered late if not given within
twenty-four hours if the parties live in the same city."); id. art. 1266(3) ("If the offeree
lived somewhere else, acceptance will be considered late if not given within thirty days
counted as of the time that is necessary for both communications to reach their
destination.").
159. For references to German law in Brazilian legal literature, see, e.g., WALD, supra
note 93, at 182. The German rule is set forth in Section 150(1) of its Civil Code: "The late
acceptance of an offer is deemed a new offer." BGB § 150(1) (F.R.G.).
160. See C.C. art. 1083 (Braz.).
161. In Argentina, this rule has been laid down by legal scholars rather than by the
legislature. See, e.g., CODIGO CIVIL, supra note 86, at 767-68.
162. See Colom. C.c. art. 855.
163. See Peru C.c. art. 1376.
164. See Uru. C.c. art. 851. This rule only applies where the offeror has not expressly
fixed the time limit for acceptance. In that situation, "la propuesta se estingue, sin
necesidad de manifestaci6n alguna por parte del proponente." 11 GAMARRA, supra note
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Venezuela and under the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, the
offeror may validate a late acceptance by informing the offeree
immediately.165 At least one commentator argues that this rule
is distinguishable from the counter-offer theory, under which the
late acceptance by the offeree constitutes a counter-offer and the
offeror's notification of his intention to be bound by the late
acceptance operates as an acceptance of the counter-offer. Under
the late acceptance rule, the offeror's notification gives effect to
the offeree's acceptance.166  Nevertheless, where the original
offeror remains silent, both rules have the same consequences: no
contract will be formed. 67
E Late Acceptance: Delay in Transmission
Some legal systems and the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention
provide for an exception where the acceptance is late due to a
delay in transmission.168 Where the acceptance was made timely,
but reaches the offeror late, the late acceptance is valid unless the
offeror informs the offeree that he considers the offer to have
lapsed. If the offeror remains silent, he will be bound by the
37, at 121.
165. See Venez. C.c. art. 1137(3); CISG, supra note 15, art. 21(1) ("A late acceptance
is nevertheless effective as an acceptance if without delay the offeror orally so informs the
offeree or dispatches a notice to that effect.").
166. Farnsworth, supra note 120, at 191.
167. Id. In Uruguay, however, the silence of the original offeror results in the
conclusion of the contract. Uru. C.c. art. 851.
168. See CISG, supra note 15, art. 21(2).
If a letter or other writing containing a late acceptance shows that it has been
sent in such circumstances that if its transmission had been normal it would have
reached the offeror in due time, the late acceptance is effective as an acceptance
unless, without delay, the offeror orally informs the offeree that he considers his
offer as having lapsed or dispatches a notice to that effect.
Id. Article 2.8(2) of the very recent UNIDROIT Draft on Principles for International
Commercial Contracts (Study L.-Doc. 40 Rev. 10) contains a similar provision.
Furthermore, several systems not under review here have also adopted similar provisions.
See, e.g., BGB § 149 (F.R.G.) ("[I]f an acceptance reaches an offeror late and was sent in
such a way that it would have arrived in time with ordinary forwarding, and the offeror
must have recognized this, on receipt of the acceptance he shall immediately notify the
acceptor of the delay, unless this has already been done. If he delays sending the
notification, the acceptance is deemed not to have been late."); PTK art. 214(4) (Hung.);
MINPO [CIVIL CODE] art. 523 (Japan); GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS RSFSR [GK RSFSR] art.
164 (Russia); Co art. 5(3) (Switz.); LO art. 43(2)(Yugo.). See Ferrari, Laformazione del
contratto, supra note 1, at 78.
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contract. In other words, silence amounts to acceptance. 69 The
underlying rationale for this exception is that, where the offeree
does not cause the delay, he may reasonably assume that the
contract is concluded, especially if he is not aware of the delay.170
In Brazil, however, notification to the offeror has a different
function: it does not avoid the conclusion of the contract, but
makes it impossible to hold the offeror liable for damages.
171
This rule protects the offeree who, unaware of the delay, relies
upon the conclusion of the contract.
172
V. THE MOMENT THE CONTRACT IS CONCLUDED
This Section will discuss the final step in contract formation:
the issue of contract conclusion. Determining the precise moment
of contract conclusion is important in legal systems in which
tangible movable property changes ownership at the moment the
contract is concluded (solu consensu).73 That moment of con-
169. See Farnsworth, supra note 120, at 191-92. Regarding Article 21(2) of the 1980
Vienna Sales Convention, Farnsworth states: "[T]he only effect of the exception is that in
the exceptional situation he is bound if he says nothing. This is a rare instance in which
a party's silence results in his being contractually bound." Id.
170. The Swiss Civil Code expressly states that "[tlhe offeror may assume that his offer
has arrived in due time." Co art. 5(2) (Switz.). For the differences between rules
governing the late acceptance due to the offeree's delay and the late acceptance due to a
delay in transmission, see Farnsworth, supra note 120, at 192.
If, as under [CISG art. 21] paragraph (1), the offeree himself is the cause of the
delay, he is not entitled to assume that there is a contract unless he hears
something to that effect from the offeror; but if, as under paragraph (2), the
offeree is not the cause of the delay, and is presumably unaware of it, he is
entitled to assume that there is a contract unless he hears something to the
contrary from the offer[orl.
Id.
171. See C.C. art. 1082 (Braz.). "Se a aceitacao, por circunstfincia imprevista, chegar
tarde ao conhecimento do proponente, este comunicd-lo-A imediatamente ao aceitante, sob
pena de responder por perdas e danos." Id. Where the offeror does not inform the
offeree that he considers his offer as having lasped, the contract is not concluded. The
offeror must, however, compensate the offeree for damages caused by his reliance upon
the conclusion of the contract.
172. See, e.g., GOMES, supra note 105, at 72; 3 PERREIRA, supra note 49, at 32.
173. These legal systems include Belgium, France, Iceland, Italy, Mexico, Norway, and
Portugal, as well as the U.S. State of Louisiana and the Canadian Province of Quebec.
For a comparative overview of the different rules that govern the transfer of property of
movable goods, see, e.g., Ernst von Caemmerer, Rechtsvergleichung und Reform der
Fahrnisiibereignung, in ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 675 (1939); Franco Ferrari, Principio consensualistico ed
Abstraktionsprinzip: un indagine comparativa, in CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 889 (1992);
Francesco Galgano, Il trasferimento della proprietii in civil law e common law, in ATLANTE
DI DIRIF=O PRIVATO COMPARATO, supra note 1, at 103; Vinding Kruse, What Does
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tract conclusion differs depending on which theory is adopted.174
The four different theories applicable to contract conclusion are
(1) declaration, (2) expedition, (3) reception, and (4) informa-
tion.'75
A. The Theory of Declaration
Under the theory of declaration,"' a mere declaration of accep-
tance concludes a contract. 7 7 "The contract is formed when the
offeree is in agreement with the offer. 1 78  This rule has been
criticized because it is difficult to prove when and if a contract has
been concluded, i.e., whether the the offeree made an affirmative
declaration of assent.179  In spite of these difficulties, however,
some South American systems, such as Chile and Peru, have
adopted this theory with regard to commercial contracts.18°
"Transfer of Property" Mean with Regard to Chattels? A Study in Comparative Law, 7 AM.
J. COMP. L. 500 (1958); VENDITA E TRASFERIMENTO DELLA PROPRIETA NELLA
PROSPETTIVA STORICO-COMPARATISTICA (Letizia Vacca ed., 1991).
174. Of course, the various theories influence more than the transfer of property or
movable goods. Indeed, the theory adopted in a particular system also influences the
possibility that the offeree may revoke his acceptance, as well as the level of risk
associated with the transmission of the acceptance. The choice of theory also determines
where the contract is concluded, an important factor in determining the applicable
contractual law.
175. See, e.g., Ferrari, La formazione del contratto, supra note 1, at 78; 11 GAMARRA,
supra note 37, at 133; 1(2) MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 69, at 130-32; RENATO
SCOGNAMIGLIO, DEI CONTRATrl IN GENERALE 99-101 (1970). See also FORMATION OF
CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 158-60 (discussing the theories of expedition, reception, and
information).
176. For a South American legal definition of the theory of declaration, see, e.g.,
BESSONE, supra note 33, at 196; De Sola, supra note 44, at 63; GOMES, supra note 105,
at 75; 3 LUYANDO, supra note 37, at 497; ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at 110; 1 PALACIO
PIMENTEL, supra note 23, at 253.
177. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 14, at 254. "Here acceptance takes place as soon as the
offeree has expressly declared his assent, for example, by writing the reply, albeit that no
notice of the acceptance has been received by the offeror." Id.
178. 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 133. See also Uru. C.c. art. 1261(1).
179. See 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 135. For an overview of the criticism and the
arguments in favor of the theory of declaration, see MELICH-ORSINI, supra note 33, at 276-
77.
180. See, e.g., RODRIGUEZ, supra note 23, at 20-21; 1 PALACIO PIMENTEL, supra note
23, at 253. This theory has not been adopted in Europe.
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B. The Theory of Expedition"'
Under the theory of expedition, also known as the mail-box
rule, the contract is formed as soon as the acceptance is "put in the
course of transmission, ' ' 182 i.e., as soon as the offeree has done
"everything which is necessary to bring the message on its way to
the offeror.'
183
As a practical matter, the expedition theory results in conse-
quences that partly correspond to those of the declaration theo-
ry." For example, the offeror bears the risk of acceptance,
because he will be bound by the contract despite his unawareness
of the acceptance.'85 This can result in unfair consequences
because, under this theory, the offeree "is not answerable for
casualties occurring at the post office"' 6 or "during the course
of transmission."'187 This hardship on the offeror has been the
basis for occasional criticisms of the expedition theory.' Never-
theless, there is an important difference between the declaration
and the expedition theories. Under the latter, it is easier to prove
the conclusion of the contract because it presupposes "external
signs that can be observed by the offeror and, therefore, it is
possible to determine with more accuracy when the contract is
concluded."'89
181. This theory seems to have been set forth in Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & ALD. 681,
106 E.R. 25 (1818).
182. FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 158. See also Sadl Litvinoff, Offer
and Acceptance in Louisiana Law: A Comparative Analysis: Part II-Acceptance, 28 LA.
L. REV. 153, 169 (1968) (stating that the theory of expedition "considers the contract
formed at the moment the acceptor parts with the letter containing the acceptance").
183. FORMATION OF CONTRACIS, supra note 1, at 159. The offeree's efforts must
include the use of the correct address. Id.
184. The declaration and the expedition theories have additional elements in common:
"Both theories are based on the general concept of the autonomy of the will. There is a
contract the moment two different wills exist, because consent takes place thereby."
Litvinoff, supra note 182, at 170.
185. FORMATION OF CoNTRACTS, supra note 1, at 159.
186. Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H.L. Cas. 381 (1848).
187. See, e.g., Household Fire & Carriage Accident Ins. Co. v. Grant, 27 W.R. 858, 48
L.J.Q.B. 577 (1879). But see British & American Telegraph Co. v. Colson, 6 L.R. 108
(1871).
188. For critical court decisions, see, e.g., Routledge v. Grant, 4 Bing. 653 (1828); Head
v. Diggon, 3 Man. & Ry. 97 (1828).
189. 3 LuYANDO, supra note 37, at 497.
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Although the expedition theory is generally considered a
"classic common law rule,"19° it also exists in several South
American civil law systems, such as Argentina, 91 Brazil,"9 and
Colombia.193
C. The Reception Theory
The reception theory appears to be "in accordance with civil
law tradition."194 Under this theory, the formation of a contract
is based on receipt of the acceptance. 95 The acceptance is valid
if it reaches the offeror "in such a way as to enable him to take
cognizance of it. ' 196 Thus, the contract is generally deemed
concluded where the acceptance arrives at an "anomalous" time,
for example, either at the start of business hours, or, where the
acceptance is contained in a letter, at the time mail is normally
190. Gyula E6rsi, Problems of Unifying Law on the Formation of Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 315 (1979). There have, however,
been some efforts to show that the expedition theory does not constitute a classic example
of the conflict between civil law and common law. See, e.g., Paola Carlini, La formazione
del contratto tra persone lontane: un aspetto della revisione della comparazione tra common
law e civil law nel quadro di un diritto comune, in RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITrO E
PROCEDURA CIVILE 114 (1984) (stating that the expedition rule laid down in Adams v.
Lindsell can already be found in the lus Comune). Some also suggest that the expedition
rule corresponds to a "civilian" doctrine based upon Pothier's teachings. See Alan W.
Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91 L.Q. REV. 247, 260 (1975).
191. See COD. Civ. art. 1154 (Arg.); see also CODIGO CIVIL, supra note 86, at 769-71;
ITURRASPE, supra note 29, at 112; Kahn, supra note 14, at 254.
192. See C.C. art. 1086 (Braz.); see also BESSONE, supra note 33, at 197; CHAVES, supra
note 74, at 401; GOMES, supra note 105, at 76; Kahn, supra note 14, at 254.
193. See Colom. Com.c. art. 864(2). Article 864(2), however, refers only to express
acceptance. Where there is an implied acceptance, the theory of information applies. See
id. art. 854.
The expedition theory can also be found in civil law countries outside of South
America. See, e.g., CODIGO DE COMERCIO [C.CoM.] art. 54 (Spain); Lebanon Code of
Obligations art. 184. The same rule was laid down by the courts in France. See, e.g., Cass.
com., Jan. 7, 1981, REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 849 (1981).
194. Eorsi, supra note 190, at 315. This rule has been expressly stated in many other
legal systems not reviewed in this article. See, e.g., ABGB § 862a (Aus.); C.c. art. 45(1)
(Czech); BGB § 130 (F.R.G.); PTK art. 213(1) (Hung.); C.c. art. 451(1) (Pol.); GK RSFSR
(Russia); Co art. 5 (Switz.). Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Scandinavian
Countries have also adopted the expedition theory. See Ferrari, La formazione del
contratto, supra note 1, at 79-87.
195. See FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 159. "The contract is not made
until the declaration of acceptance has reached the offeror." Id. See also Litvinoff, supra
note 182, at 170. "According to the third theory, that of reception, the acceptance takes
place at the moment when its communication reaches the offeror." Id.
196. FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 159. See also 1 CASAS RINCON,
supra note 33, at 58; 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 137-38.
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delivered.'97 If the acceptance reaches its destination in the
manner required and in adequate time, the contract is considered
to be concluded even if the offeror is not aware of it.'98
The reception theory, adopted by Uruguay'99 and, more
recently, by the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, 2°° better allocates
the inherent risk in concluding a contract between the parties.
During the initial phase of a contract, the offeree bears the risk of
transmission; if the acceptance is lost, there is no contract even
though an acceptance occured. 2 ' In contrast, during the second
phase-after the acceptance reaches an area under the offeror's
control202-the offeror bears the risk that he will be contractually
bound even if he has no knowledge of the acceptance. °3
D. The Information Theory
The conclusion of a contract may be governed by the informa-
tion theory, under which a contract is formed when "the offeror
actually takes notice of the declaration of acceptance.' 21 Al-
197. This rule is generally accepted in most countries. For relevant court decisions, see,
e.g., Helmut Heinrichs, Kommentar zu BGB §§1-432, in PALANDT BORGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH 1, 101 (49th ed. 1990).
198. See Litvinoff, supra note 182, at 170. "Thus, if such a letter arrives at its
destination in proper time, but the offeror is not there to receive it until after the time for
acceptance has expired, the contract will be concluded." Id. See also Kahn, supra note
14, at 254 (stating that the contract is concluded where "the letter of acceptance reaches
the offeror's address, i.e., before it comes to his mind, and even though it never reaches
his mind").
199. See Uru. C.c. art. 1265. "The contract agreed upon by messenger or by letter or
telegraph, is concluded in the place and by the act in which the acceptance by the offeree
reaches the offeror." Id. See also 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 137. "As a general
rule, the Uruguyan Code lays down the theory of reception." Id.
200. See CISG, supra note 15, art. 18(2). "An acceptance of an offer becomes effective
at the moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror." Id. This rule, however, is
mitigated by Article 16(1) of CISG, which states that an offer may be revoked only if "the
revocation reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an acceptance." Id. Thus, the
general principle that "[u]ntil a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked ... is a half
truth. In fact, the right of revocation ceases when the offeree dispatches the acceptance
and not necessarily when the contract is concluded." E6rsi, supra note 190, at 160.
201. See Litvinoff, supra note 182, at 170. "If a letter of acceptance is lost, there is no
contract." Id. Regarding this risk, see also FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at
159. "The risk of loss or delay of the declaration of acceptance in the course of
transmission is on the offeree." Id.
202. In Germany, this area is called Machtbereich des Antragenden. See, e.g., HANS
BROX, ALLGEMEINER TElL DES BGB § 155 (1986).
203. See FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 162.
204. Id. at 160; see also DIEz-PICAzO & GULLON, supra note 73, at 76; GALGANO,
supra note 13, at 70.
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though this theory is most consistent with the idea that both
parties should be aware 205 of the other party's declaration of
assent,2' it results in a serious disadvantage. Because it would
be difficult for the offeree to prove that the offeror had knowledge
of the acceptance,2 7 the acceptor "would be uncertain as to
when the contract is concluded., 20 8  Under the information
theory as adopted by countries such as Peru2°9 and Venezue-
la,21° the offeree bears the burden of proving the transmis-
sion.211 This occurs in situations where the acceptance is delayed
or never reaches the offeror.212
The introduction of a presumption (iuris tantum), under which
the acceptance is presumed to be known when it reaches the
offeror, has weakened the rigidity of this rule. Consequently, its
disadvantages have been mitigated. In order to deny a vinculum
iuris, a "legal bond," the offeror must establish ignorance of the
acceptance. This mitigated information rule,213 which has been
adopted by Venezuela214 and resembles the rule adopted in
205. See 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 136 (asserting that the theory "of knowledge
is the one that more closely fits with the principles of legal logic").
206. This has been expressly pointed out by the official introduction accompanying the
Italian Civil Code: "It is not admissible that a subject is voluntarily bound without having
knowledge of the commitment which is acquired upon notice of the other party's will of
full adhesion to the offer. What is more, this corresponds to the exigencies of commerce
which requires security and clarity." RELAZIONE AL RE n.70 (1942).
207. See 11 GAMARRA, supra note 37, at 136 ("[S]ince the knowledge [of the
acceptance] by the offeror is a subjective fact, it is difficult for the offeree to establish [that
knowledge].").
208. FERNANDEZ & ACOSTA, supra note 33, at 174.
209. See Peru C.c. art. 1373. In Peru, however, the information rule does not apply to
commercial contracts, which are governed by the declaration theory. See supra text
accompanying note 211.
210. See Venez. C.c. art. 1262(2).
211. This rule has also been set forth expressly in C.c. art. 61 (Alg.); C.c. art. 97
(Egypt); CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art.1326(1) (Italy); C6DIGO CIVIL [C.CIv.] art. 1262(2)
(Spain). The rationale for imposing the burden of proof upon the offeree is that "at least
[the offeree] knows that [the acceptance] was dispatched and it seems natural to have him
bear the risk of delay or loss of his own letter rather than to put this burden upon the
addressee who is uninformed even as to the act of dispatch." Nussbaum, supra note 72,
at 927.
212. See FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 160.
213. The "pure" information theory can be found in Peru and Venezuela, at least with
respect to commercial contracts. See Peru C.c. art. 1374; Venez. Com.c. art. 115.
214. For this presumption in Venezuelan law, see, e.g., MELICH-ORSINI, supra note 33,
at 159 (asserting that acceptances "are presumed known from the moment they reach the
[address of] the addressee, unless it can be proven that he was not at fault in finding
himself in a situation where it was impossible for him to know of [the acceptance].").
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Italy215 and Egypt,2 16 is similar to the reception theory, which
seems to be the best rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
The formation of contracts in South America involves
problems similar to those found in common law and European
civil law systems. South American legal systems, however,
sometimes offer better solutions in the area of contract revocation
and its effects.
Examination of the problems of contract formation in South
America results in a legal comparison that crosses the boundaries
of the traditional comparison between common law and European
civil law.
215. See C.c. art. 1135 (Italy).
216. See C.c. art. 97(2) (Egypt).
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